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MINOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN NORTH DAKOTA
David Skeen*
"[E]very lawsuit is a miniature war, in which the
respective combatants are bringing into the action all
their ingenuity, energy and resourcefulness for the
purpose of acquiring victory and, like war, when the
battle is ended there still remains in the breasts of the
participants a certain amount of resentment against their
late adversaries."
Klein v. Hutton
191 N.W. 485, 486 (1922)
I. INTRODUCTION
North Dakota has a long history of providing convenient and
inexpensive procedures for the resolution of minor disputes. Boards
of Conciliation were created in 1895 and existed until 1943.1 In
*B.A., University of Washington, 1970; J.D. Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1973; currently
attending graduate program in criminal law, University of San Diego School of Law; member of
North Dakota, Minnesota, and Nebraska Bars.
1. 1895 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 22 (codified in 1913 COMPILED LAWS OF N.D., SS 9187-92; repealed
1921 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 38, §515).
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1935 a law establishing County Debt Adjustment Boards2 was
enacted, and the two forums existed for eight years as alternative
methods for minor dispute resolution. Legislation establishing
small claims courts was passed in 19713 and is the most significant
legislation for resolving minor disputes which now exists in North
Dakota.
This article will examine and discuss each of these laws
separately with a considerable emphasis on small claims courts.
Each section of the Small Claims Court Act will be separately
discussed with the expectation that this procedure will provide a
convenient method for future reference. At the conclusion of each
section discussion, there are suggestions for recommended changes
in the existing Small Claims Court Act. These recommendations
are directed primarily toward the removal of inconsistencies with
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the establishment of flexible
standards for consideration of evidence, and the assistance to
litigants for effective use of the court.
There are significant numbers of small claims court cases in
the North Dakota judicial system,4  and attorneys and non-
attorneys alike should become better acquainted with the
procedures available for this part of the judiciary system.
2. 1935 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 114 (codified in 1943 N.D. REV. CODE ch. 11-26).
3. 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 303. The purpose of these courts is to provide a speedy hearing at
low cost to the litigants. Annot., 167 A.L.R. 827, 827-28 (1947). Seealso S. 483, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(19 79 ), also called the "Dispute Resolution Act." in which the Congress established a Dispute
Resolution Resource Center to assist communities in developing dispute resolution mechanisms
throughout the country. The Congress has, however, failed to fund the program. 66 A.B.A.J. 954,
955 (Aug. 1980).
4. NORTH DAKOTA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT, 35-38 (1979). The report states that in
county courts with incrcased jurisdiction, there were 5,108 small claims court cases filed in 1979.
This figure was more than double the amount of all civil cases filed and approximately equal to the
total amount of 5,234 civil, probate, guardianship, and mental health and commitment cases filed in
1979.
In county justice courts there were 1,099 small claims court cases filed, whereas the total civil
and mental health and commitment case filings totaled only forty-four cases.
COUNTY COURTS WITH INCREASEDJURISDICTION
CASE FILINGS AND DISPOSITIONS
Calendar Year - 1979
Small Claims ............................ ........... ........ 5108 (total cases filed)
C ivil . . .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. . . . ... ... .. .... ... . .. .. ... . .. . ... . 2334
P robate .......... ................ .................. ............. 1784
G uardianship ..................................................... 266
M ental Health & Commitments ........................................ 850
(Total cases filed) 5234
COUNTYJUSTICE COURT
CASE FILINGS AND DISPOSITIONS
Calendar Year - 1979
Small Claims .................... .............. -. 1099 (total cases filed)
C ivil ....... .. . .. . . .. .. .. .. . . .. . . . .. . ... .. .... ... . .. . . .. .. ... .. .. . . 2
M ental Health & Commitments ......................................... 42
(Total cases filed) -44
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II. BOARDS OF CONCILIATION
North Dakota's first attempts to officially assist in minor
dispute resolution were the Boards of Conciliation, created initially
in 1895. 5 The Boards consisted of four commissioners who were
elected at the same time and in the same manner as justices of the
peace. Boards were established in each town, incorporated village,
and city, and the commissioners were elected for two year terms. 6
After a civil action had been initiated and before the return
date of the summons, either party could request, with the consent
of the other party, an appearance before two of the elected
commissioners of the Board of Conciliation. If both parties
appeared they were allowed to state their differences to the
commissioners, who then reduced the statements to writing. These
documents constituted the pleadings in the case. The parties could
then introduce evidence and, in the discretion of the
commissioners, be sworn and give testimony. After the hearing the
commissioners were required, to the best of their ability, to
persuade the parties to agree to an amicable settlement of the case.
If an agreement was reached, it was reduced to writing and entered
in the docket book as a judgment. 7
The parties were required to appear personally before the
commissioners unless they were non-residents or could show just
cause. In these cases a party could appear by an agent duly
authorized in writing. Attorneys were barred from representing the
parties unless they were acting as agents. Failure by the parties to
reach an agreement required a certification by the commissioners
to the county justice that an agreement had not been reached. The
parties could then proceed to trial.8 No part of the proceedings
before the commissioners was admissible as evidence at a
subsequent trial, and the commissioners could not testify as to any
matter. 9
In 1921 the law was repealed and the district court judges were
required to establish a Conciliation Board in the county of their
respective districts.10  Any qualified voter was eligible for
appointment as a conciliator, including members of the bar.II The
5. 1895 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 22 (codified in 1913 COMPILED LAWS OF N.D., SS 9187-92; repealed
1921 LAWS oF N.D. ch. 38, 5 15).
6. 1895 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 22 S1.
7. Id. at S2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at S 4.
10. 1921 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 38, S 1 (codified in 1921 COMPILED LAWS OF N.D., §§ 9192 (a)(1)-
9192 (a) (15) (Supp. 1925); repealed N.D. REV. CODE ch. 228 (1943)).
11. 1921 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 38, §2.
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party requesting conciliation paid the conciliator a twenty-five cent
fee for cases involving the sum of ten dollars or less, and the sum of
fifty cents in cases involving the sum of over ten dollars. A
successful result entitled the conciliator to an additional fee. 12
No process could be issued to commence a civil action in
district court unless the moving party filed with the court a
certificate of a conciliator showing that an attempt to settle the case
had been made and that no agreement was reached. A district
judge could, however, waive this requirement. This rule did not
apply to cases involving more than $200, actions involving title to
or possession of real, property, or provisional or remedial
remedies. 13
The parties were summoned to the hearing by letter,
telephone, or personal contact. 14 No record was made of the
proceedings, and no part of the proceeding was admissible as
evidence at a subsequent trial. 5 Attorneys were not permitted to
represent either of the parties, but any other person could appear
and represent them. 16 If the parties reached an agreement it was
reduced to writing and had the full force and effect of a district
court judgment. 17 Failure to agree. on a settlement resulted in a
certificate of no settlement and a subsequent trial. 18
In Klein v. Hutton 9 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reviewed the 1921 law. The facts indicated that the defendant
executed and delivered his promissory note to the plaintiff in the
sum of sixty dollars and that only two dollars had been repaid.
Plaintiff filed suit in district court to recover the amount due, but
made no attempt to have his claim submitted to conciliation as the
law required. The defendant answered, alleging the failure of the
plaintiff to proceed first to the conciliation board. At the time of
the commencement of the action, a conciliation board was acting in
the county. 20 The district court held for the plaintiff, and defendant
appealed, challenging the 1921 law on eight separate grounds. 21
12. Id.
13. Id. at S 5.
14. Id. at 5 6.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 5 13.
17. Id. at S 11.
18. Id. at 5 12.
19.49 N.D. 248, 191 N.W. 485 (1922). Seealso Annot., 167 A.L.R. 827,831 (1947).
20. Klein v. Hutton, 49 N.D. 248, 251-52, 191 N.W. 485, 486 (1922). The plaintiff had not
filed, in any court, a certificate of a conciliator indicating any attempt to settle the claim, but the
claim nonetheless met all jurisdictional requirements for conciliation. Id. at 256, 191 N.W. at 486.
21. Id. at 252, 191 N.W. 485. The court discussed the eight grounds throughout the case.
"Point [1]. Appellant contends that the Act is unconstitutional and contravenes section 61 of the
Constitution of North Dakota, in that its title is defective." Id. at 253, 191 N.W. at 487. "Point [2].
It is contended that appellant was denied the right of trial by jury secured by section 7 of the state
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Since North Dakota was the first state to establish a state-wide
system of informal conciliation, the North Dakota Supreme Court
believed the case was of national significance. 2 The court reasoned
that the principle of private resolution of disputes embodied in the
law was derived from Norway and Denmark because many of the
state's citizens originated from those countries.21 Several
prominent attorneys and organizations participated in the case. 24
The defendant contended, among other things, that he was
denied the right of trial by jury. 25  The court dismissed this
argument, stating that the Conciliation Board was not a court but
rather a tribunal authorized under section 120 of the North Dakota
Constitution, and that no right to a jury trial existed except in a
court.
26
A violation of due process was also alleged by the defendant. 21
The court held that the requirement of attempted conciliation as a
condition precedent to filing a lawsuit was not a denial of due
process. The court found that it related to the remedy to enforce the
obligation and not to the obligation itself. 28
III. COUNTY DEBT ADJUSTMENT BOARDS
In 1935 the legislature enacted a provision for County Debt
Adjustment Boards. 29 The boards, whose authorization continues,
are composed of not less than three nor more than seven residents
of the county and are selected by the district court judges for each
constitution, which provides so far as material here: 'The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate.' " Id. at 256, 191 N.W. at 488. "Points 13 and 4]. It is contended that the Act
violates section 13 of the Constitution of the state of North Dakota and article 5 and 14 of the
amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 258, 191 N.W. at 489. "Points 5 to 8,
both Isic] inclusive, may be disposed of together. Appellant contends that the Act contravenes section
20 of the state constitution." Id. at 259, 191 N.W. at 489.
22. Id. at 252, 191 N.W. at 486. The court believed the Conciliation Act concerned not only the
social welfare of North Dakota's citizens, but indirectly concerned the welfare of citizens of other
states because North Dakota was the first state to establish a state-wide tribunal of conciliation. Id.
23. Id. at 253, 191 N.W. at 486.
24. Id. at 252, 191 N.W. at 486. A brief was filed byJohn H. Wigmore, author of WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, appearing on behalf of the American Judicature Society, and Herbert Harley and Albert
Kocourek as amici curiae.
25. Id. at 256, 191 N.W. at 488.
26. Id. at 257-58, 191 N.W. at 488-89. The court distinguished the authority of a conciliation
board or conciliator and a court, stating the conciliator's authority was exercised in the manner
prescribed by law, while a court proceeds by judicial power to determine a controversy regardless of
the consent of the parties.
27. Id. at 258, 191 N.W. at 489. The defendant contended the law violated section 13 of the
North Dakota Constitution, and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. The court held section 13 related to criminal prosecutions and had no application to
the case. It also dismissed the fifth amendment claim, stating it was a limitation on the federal
government but not the states. Here the conciliator was acting pursuant to a state statute not a
federal statute. Id. at 258, 191 N.W. at 489.
28. Id. at 258-59, 191 N.W. at 489. It is important to note the defendant was not challenging the
validity of the act requiring submission of a claim to conciliation prior to commencing a lawsuit. Id.
29. 1953 LAWS OF N.D. ch. 114 (codified in N.D. REV. CODE ch. 11-26 (1943)).
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judicial district. 30  Rules of procedure for these boards are
prescribed and adopted in the same manner as the district court,
and the clerk of district court is the board's secretary.
3
'
Either a debtor or a creditor may request a meeting of the
board in the county of his residence by paying a five dollar fee with
the district court clerk. 32 At the meeting, inquiry is made into the
financial condition of the debtor. 33 The board "shall attempt to
conciliate between the debtor and his creditors and shall advise and
assist in arriving at a fair basis upon which the debts can be
adjusted, refinanced or paid. '34 The board is also to advise,
counsel, and assist the parties in arriving at some agreement as to
the conduct of any future relations between them. 35 Any settlement
or compromise is not admissible in evidence in any subsequent
court proceeding. 
36
IV. SMALL CLAIMS COURT
A. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS
The central feature of minor dispute resolution in North
Dakota is currently found in the system of small claims courts. The
current scheme had its genesis in 1971 .37 The act provided that
judges of county courts with increased jurisdiction or county
justices shall exercise jurisdiction over small claims court. 38 As
introduced, the bill confined the court's jurisdiction to cases for the
recovery of money when the amount did not exceed $250.39 There
was considerable debate on the jurisdiction limits with proposals to
raise the amount which could be claimed. 40 By amendment, the
amount was established at $200 or less. The court's jurisdiction
was expanded, however, to include cancellation of any agreement
involving material fraud, deception, misrepresentation, or false
promise, when the value of the agreement did not exceed $200.41
30. N.D. REV. CODE 5 11-2601 (1943).
31. N.D. REV. CODE SS11-2608; 11-2603 (1943).
32. N.D. REV. CODE § 11-2604 (1943).
33. N.D. REV. CODE § li-2605 (1943).
34. N.D. REV. CODE § 11-2606 (1943).
35. Id.
36. N.D. REv. CODE § 11-2607 (1943) (superseded by N.D.R. EvID. 408).
37. 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 303.
38. Id.
39. H.B. 1401, 42d N.D. Leg. (1971).
40. N.D.J. OF THE HousE, 765 (Feb. 16, 1971). The committee on Judiciary recommended the
jurisdictional limit be raised to five hundred dollars.
41. N.D.J. OF THE HousE, 781 (Feb. 17, 1971); N.D.J. OF THE HousE, 1391 (Mar. 15, 1971).
See also Driscoll, De Minims Curat Lex-Small Claims Court in New York City, 2 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 479,
488-90 (1974) (discusses jurisdictional restrictions in other states).
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Actions based either on contract or tort could be brought in small
claims court.4 2
In 1975 the jurisdictional limits were amended to include all
actions up to $500 in a county court of increased jurisdiction.
County justice courts retained the $200 limit. 43 During the 1977
legislative session these limits were again amended, allowing actions
not exceeding $1,000 in a county court of increased jurisdiction and
$500 in county justice courts. 44
Actions may only be commenced in the county of defendant's
residence if the defendant is a natural person. 45 Actions against
corporations or partnerships may be initiated in any county in
which the defendant has a place of business or in the county where
the subject matter of the claim arose.4 6
The questions of jurisdiction and venue for small claims court
were addressed in Bernhardt v. Dittus.4 7  In Bernhardt the
plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to serve an order for appearance
by certified mail. The defendant refused to accept delivery,
believing the letter contained a bill. A trial was scheduled,
however, and a default judgment was entered for plaintiff upon
defendant's failure to appear.4 8 A motion to vacate the judgment
was filed by the defendant, who alleged that he was not, at the time
of judgment, a resident of Stark County and, therefore, was not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Stark County small claims court.4 9
The small claims court denied the motion, and the defendant filed a
writ of certiorari in the Stark County district court to determine
whether the small claims court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it entered judgment. 50  The district court vacated the
judgment on the grounds that the defendant was a resident of Dunn
42. Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. 197 (Aug. 8, 1974). The question presented was whether the small
claims court could be used for actions based on tort. The Attorney General stated the legislature had
not distinguished claims in tort from claims based upon contract obligations since the statute
generally refers to "cases for recovery of money." Id. See also GILES, THE OPERATION OF NORTH
DAKOTA'S SMALL CLAIMS COURT, 28-30 (Aug. 11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as GILES]; Kosmin, The
Small Claims Court Ditemna 13 Hous. L. REV. 934, 948-49 (1976). Giles determined that claims for the
payment due for goods and services accounted for 49.2 % of the cases in North Dakota. GILES, supra
at 62 (Table 6).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-01 (1975). See also N.D.J. OF THE HOUSE, 315 (Jan. 28, 1975).
44. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979). See also N.D.J. OF THE HOUSE, 110 (Jan. 10,
1977); Minutes of the N.D. HouseJudiciary Comm. Hearings on H.B. 1189 (Jan. 18, 1977); Kosmin, supra
note 42, at 949-50; Driscoll, supra note 41, at 488-90.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979). Giles determined individuals were plaintiffs.in
46.2 % of the cases and defendants in 81.4 % of the cases. See GILES, supra note 42, at 62 (Tables 3 and
4). At least four other studies have shown that the vast majority of claims are businesses against
consumers. See Kosmin, supra note 42, at 940-41 n. 30.
46. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979). Giles determined businesses were plaintiffs in
53.8% of the cases and defendants in 18.6% of the cases. Giles, supra note 42, at 62. (Tables 3 and 4).
47. 265 N.W. 2d 684 (N.D. 1978).
48. Bernhardt v. Dittus, 265 N.W.2d 684, 684-85 (N.D. 1978).
49. Id. at 685.
50. Id.
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County and the small claims court was without jurisdiction.5 1
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the
provision pertained to the jurisdiction of the small claims court
and not merely the venue of the action. 52 The supreme court held
that a small claims court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an
action which is commenced in a county other than that of the
defendant's residence. 53
A non-resident plaintiff should also be denied a North Dakota
small claims court as his forum. The North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure do not provide any basis for personal jurisdiction over a
resident defendant when the plaintiff is a non-resident and the
cause of action arose in a foreign jurisdiction. 54  There is no
legitimate interest or reason for a North Dakota small claims court
to assume jurisdiction in such cases and resolve claims of foreign
jurisdictions. The non-resident plaintiff still has a right to file the
action in the county and state where the acts occurred, and no
prejudice results to his claim by a denial of North Dakota small
claims court jurisdiction.
A North Dakota court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a person found within or domiciled in the state. 55 The Small Claims
Court Act, however, provides that the defendant must be a
resident for the court to assume jurisdiction, and the mere fact that
the defendant is physically within a county would not be
sufficient. 56
The jurisdictional provision also states that no claim shall be
filed by an assignee, 57 and no garnishment or attachment may issue
from the small claims court.5 8 Thus, any action must be brought in
the name of the original claimant. 59
51. Id. It was undisputed at the district court hearing that Bernhardt was residing in Dunn
County rather than Stark County. Id. at 686.
52. Id. at 686. The court cited section 27-08.1-01 of the North Dakota Century Code and
Johnson v. Johnson, 86 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1957).
53. 265 N.W.2d at 686. The court believed the language "shall be commenced in the county of
defendant's residence," rather than providing that the proceedings "shall be tried" in the county of
defendant's residence, indicated an intent to make the requirement a jurisdictional rather than a
venue requirement. Id. at 686.
54. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4 (b) (2).
55. Id. The use of "may" indicates a legislative intent to allow a court to decline jurisdiction
simply because the defendant is found in the state.
56. N.D. CENT. CooE § 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979). See also 265 N.W.2d at 686.
57. N.D. CENT. CooE 5 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979). See also Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. 86 (April 9,
1975). The Attorney General was asked to decide "whether the term 'subrogee' is the same as or is
synonymously incorporated in the term 'assignee' as is used in the statute." Id. The Attorney
General distinguished subrogation from assignment and stated the restriction against an assignee
was apparently inserted in the statute to avoid the "buying of claims" and utilizing the small claims
court provisions for the collection of those claims. Id. at 87. The opinion also stated that a party who
is subrogated to the rights of a possible claimant does not come within the restriction of section 27-
08.1-01. Id. See generally Note, Small Claims Courts as Collection Agencies, 4 STAN. L. REV. 237 (1951-52).
58. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1979).
59. Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. 88 (April 9, 1975).
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B. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION - CLAIM AFFIDAVIT
Actions in small claims court are commenced by first
purchasing a standard set of forms, filling out the forms with the
required information on the statement of claim, and filing the
notarized statement of claim with the court. 60 The action must be
filed prior to any service of process. This procedure differs
substantially from the procedure in district or county court, where
the action is commenced by the service of the summons and may
not be commenced by filing a complaint. 61
Service of the statement of claim on the defendant is achieved
by personal service on the defendant or by certified mail, along
with an order for appearance setting a time and place for hearing. 62
Service may be made anywhere within the state, and hearings are
to be held not less than five days nor more than thirty days after
service. 63
In Bernhardt the North Dakota Supreme Court held that in
the absence of a return receipt or other proof that the defendant
received the claim affidavit and order for appearance, there is no
basis upon which the small claims court can conclude it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 64 The court also held that
there is no personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 27-08.1-02,
unless and until the defendant is in actual receipt of the claim
affidavit and order for appearance. 65
Service of the statement of claim by certified mail is
considerably different from that permitted by the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure. No provision is made in the Rules for
personal service by certified mail, and the only time mailing is
permitted is after service by publication, when personal service
cannot be accomplished. 66 Service by mail of pleadings and papers
subsequent to the original complaint is permissible, and
presumably, this rule also applies to small claims court. 67
Parties in small claims court also have the option of personal
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-02 (1974). See also GILES, supra note 42, at 49-54 (discussing
dissemination of information regarding small claims court).
61. N.D.R. Civ. P. 3. See also Coman v. Williams, 78 N.D. 560, 50 N.W.2d 494 (1952).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-02 (1974).
63. Id. 69.6% of the cases filed are disposed of within thirty days. See GILES, supra note 42, at 65
(Table 12).
64. 265 N.W.2d at 687. The court stated that a statute that sets forth requirements for making
service must be strictly complied with, and that a judgment based upon service when the statute has
not been complied with is void. Id. at 687.
65. Id. See also Pagter, McCloskey & Reinis, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REV.
876, 880 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Pagter], which states the California court has no jurisdiction to
renderjudgment unless proof of service is filed with the court.
66. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4(e).
67. N.D.R. Civ. P. 5 (b).
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service of the statement of claim on the defendant. 68 The act is
unclear, however, as to whether the plaintiff may personally service
the defendant or whether he must follow the requirements of the
civil procedure rules, which do not allow the plaintiff to personally
serve the defendant. 69 In order to remedy this ambiguity and to
make service of process consistent throughout the North Dakota
judicial system, service should be made pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure.
C. INFORMAL HEARING - ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
FILING AND SERVICE FEES - EXAMINATION OF DEBTOR
Section 27-08.1-03 sets forth the procedure and conduct of the
hearing and obligations of the parties. In 1971 specific language
was incorporated stating the parties could appear without
counsel. 70 No court reporter is to be present unless arranged and
paid for by one of the parties. 71 There are no formal pleadings other
than the statement of claim and order for appearance. 72 The
defendant may file an answer and a claim affidavit setting forth any
new matter constituting a counterclaim. It should be noted that
compulsory counterclaims are limited to those whose value does not
exceed the jurisdictional limits. 73 The counterclaim must be
personally delivered to the plaintiff not later than forty-eight hours
before the trial. 74 The relaxation of formal pleading requirements
indicates a legislative intent to make these cases informal and
inexpensive for the parties, and the attorney general has so
interpreted the Small Claims Court Act. 71
It is also clear that the court is to assume a significant role in
resolving the case. In a departure from standard court procedures,
the small claims court is allowed to make its inquiry before, during,
or after the hearing. 76 No comparable authority exists for district or
county court judges. Amendments should be made to section 27-
68. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-02 (1974).
69. N.D.R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1). The rule specifically prohibits service within the state by a party or
anyone interested in the action.
70. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-03 (Supp. 1979). See also Kosmin, supra note 42, at 956-57, who
states that most jurisdictions prohibit attorneys from appearing in small claims court.
71. N.D. CENT. CODE 527-08.1-03 (Supp. 1979).
72. Id.
73. Id. See also N.D.R. Civ. P. 13(a) for compulsory counterclaim rule.
74. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-03 (Supp. 1979). For service of the counterclaim pursuant to
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, see N.D.R. Civ. P. 5(b).
75. Op. N.D. Att'y Gen. 198 (Aug. 8, 1974). The Attorney General stated that "[tjhe obvious
purpose of the Small Claims Court Act is to provide a forum whereby the parties can litigate their
rights in an inexpensive and uncomplicated manner. See also GILes, supra note 42, at 7-16.
76. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-03 (Supp. 1979).
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08.1-03 to clearly indicate that the rules of evidence do not apply.
The court should be vested with wide discretion to admit any
evidence of probative value.
In the 1971 statute, trial by jury was waived if neither party,
before the commencement of the trial, demanded ajury, or if either
party failed to appear at the time fixed for the trial. 77 Either party
had the option of demanding a jury, which was composed of six
jurors or any number less than six agreed upon by the parties. 78
The 1975 legislature proposed that the right to a jury trial be
retained by submitting a request in writing with a deposit for one
day's jury fees for six jurors. 79 A subsequent amendment, however,
eliminated trial by jury in small claims court. 80
A defendant desiring a jury trial may properly remove the case
to county or district court. The plaintiff's right to a jury trial is
preserved by initially filing the action in county or district court and
electing not to proceed in small claims court.
D. ELECTION TO PROCEED IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT
IRREVOCABLE
Election by the plaintiff to use the procedures provided for in
the Small Claims Court Act are irrevocable. 8' In the event the
plaintiff elects to discontinue the proceedings, and unless otherwise
provided, the court issues an order of dismissal with prejudice.82
The statute currently fails to provide specifically for dismissal
stemming from the plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing. This
should also result in an order of dismissal with prejudice, and an
amendment to this effect would aid in expediting the work of the
court.
In conjunction with the 1975 amendment to section 27-08.1-
03, prohibiting trial by jury, section 27-08.1-04 was amended to
provide that the plaintiff waives his right to appeal from the
decision of the small claims court. 83 The defendant also waives his
77. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-03'(1974).
78. Id.
79. N.D.J. OF THE HOUSE 492 (Feb. 5, 1975).
80. N.D.J. OF THE HOUSE 1118 (Mar. 6, 1975).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-04 (Supp. 1979).
82. A voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
is without prejudice. N.D.R. Ctv. P. 41(a). An involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure operates as an adjudication upon the merits. N.D.R. CIv. P.
4 1(b).
83. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-04 (1975). See also Minutes of the HouseJudiciary: Hearings on H. B.
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right of appeal unless he elects to remove the case from small claims
court to the court having jurisdiction over the matter in the absence
of the small claims court. 84
Removal is perfected as follows: (1) Filing with the small
claims court and serving upon the plaintiff a notice of removal; and
(2) filing with the clerk of the court to which the action is removed a
copy of the claim affidavit and defendant's answer along with the
filing fee, no later than forty-eight (48) hours before the hearing.8 5
It is interesting to note that no similar provision exists in the Rules
of Civil Procedure allowing the defendant to elect the trial court,
and conceivably, the trial judge.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the losing party will not
be allowed a second trial in a small claims court case. Either the
matter proceeds in small claims court without the right of appeal,
or the case is removed for trial to county or district court where an
appeal is permitted from an adverse decision. There is no provision
for a trial de novo in county or district court if a party loses in small
claims court.
E. JUDGMENT
Appeals to the district court were permitted in the 1971 law by
an "aggrieved" party, meaning either party could appeal. 86 All
proceedings in the district court were conducted in accordance with
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and local court rules. 8 7
In 1975, in conjunction with the amendments to sections 27-
08.1-03 and 27-08.1-04, the appeal provision was abolished.8 8 The
North Dakota Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
this amendment in Hansen v. Dennis.89  Defendant Hansen
attempted to appeal the decision of the Burleigh County district
court affirming a judgment rendered against him in the Burleigh
County small claims court. The clerk of district court, upon advice
of the State's attorney, refused to accept the notice of appeal on the
1516 (Feb. 5, 1975). Mr. Al Wolff, North Dakota Bar Association, testitied that in tour years only
one decision appealed to district court had been reversed. Id.
In California the plaintiff waives his right to a jury trial by electing to proceed in small claims
court. See Pagter, supra note 65, at 881.
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-04 (1975).
85. Id.
86. N.D. CENT. COoE 5 27-08.1-05 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CoDE § 27-08.1-05
(Supp. 1979)).
87. Id.
88. Id. Seealso N.D.J. oFTHE HOUSE 1118 (Mar. 6, 1975).
89. 232 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1975). Although the constitutionality of section 27-08.1-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code was the issue before the court, this case is included in the discussion of
section 5 since this section provided for an appeal in the 1971 act.
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ground that no appeal was possible pursuant to the Small Claims
Court Act. 90
Upon the clerk's refusal to accept the notice of appeal, Hansen
sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The court in Weichel v. Hansen91 denied the application, stating that
Hansen could file a mandamus proceeding in the district court. 92
Upon the filing of the writ, the Burleigh County district court
denied the application for a writ of mandamus, and Hansen
appealed from the order denying the writ. 93
Chief Justice Erickstad, with Justice Paulson concurring,
distinguished Hansen's case from those cases in which an appeal
was authorized by statute, but the clerk of court declined to accept
the notice of appeal. Here the court reasoned that no appeal was
possible and stated that section 27-08.1-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code supported the clerk's refusal to file the notice of
appeal and undertaking. 94
The court went on to consider the constitutional argument
resulting from a denial of the right to appeal, although it contended
the constitutionality of this section was not an issue on appeal. 95
The court believed that Hansen was contending that a plaintiff had
a choice to file his claim in small claims court, whereas a defendant
had no choice and was thus discriminated against.9 6 The court
indicated that only invidious discrimination violates the equal
protection clause of either the United States Constitution or the
North Dakota Constitution and did not find the discrimination
complained of by Hansen to be invidious. The court upheld the
constitutionality of the provision. 97
The basis for this position was apparently an attempt to limit
the court's workload and discourage appeals of small claims court
cases to the supreme court. Chief Justice Erickstad stated his
position as follows:
In so holding, we take judicial notice of the fact that the
90. Hansen v. Dennis, 232 N.W.2d 49, 50 (N.D. 1975). The clerk of court and state's attorney
based their decision on section 27-08.1-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
91. 219 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1974).
92. Weichel v. Hansen, 219 N.W.2d 118, 119-20 (N.D. 1974). The North Dakota Supreme
Court stated the issue as whether this was a proper case for the exercise of its superintending control
over inferior courts, and held this power is not invoked unless an emergency exists and there is no
other adequate means of correcting the claimed error. Id.
93. 232 N.W.2d at 50.
94. Id. at 50-5 1. Hansen raised the issue of whether it is within the administrative duties of the
clerk of district court to determine whether an appeal is proper. Id.
95. Id. at 52.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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work of this court is increasing not only in volume but
also in complexity. If we are to do justice to the cases that
are appealed to us within the provisions of the laws passed
by our State Legislature, we must have time to devote to
them. We draw attention to the fact that the jurisdiction
of the small claims court is 'confined to cases . . . where
the amount claimed . . . does not exceed two hundred
dollars. '98
It was obvious that the Chief Justice believed the court would have
been inundated with appeals from small claims court cases unless a
positive policy to discourage those appeals was firmly established. 99
Justice Pederson, in a strong dissent, took issue with the Chief
Justice on the constitutional issue. He reasoned that any statute
which denies a defendant any choice of a forum before his rights
have been determined would result in invidious discrimination. 100
His strongest criticism was directed at the "workload" argument
of the Chief Justice, and he stated the following: "Yet, for the sake
of expediency, Hansen's constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection of the laws are extinguished without even allowing
him the opportunity to be heard on the issue.'" 11 Justice Pederson
believed that Hansen did raise a question as to the constitutionality
of section 27-08.1-06 and would have reversed the trial court,
requiring the original appeal to be filed. 102
This section also requires the small claims court to enter a
written judgment indicating its decision in all cases filed with the
court on the basis of the evidence presented. 10 3 It further requires
that ajudgment be entered even if either party fails to appear. 104
The difficulty with this rule in a small claims court action is
98. Id.
99. Id. Justice Vogel concurred in the result, but dissented in regards to the constitutionality of
the provision denying appeals, believing that the parties had not properly raised the issue. Id. at 52
(Vogel, J., concurring). Justice Voge! believed the only issue before the court was the propriety of the
order denying the writ of mandamus. Id.
100. Id. at 53 (Pederson, J., dissenting). Justice Pederson stated that the right to a
determination of the constitutionality of a statute is not a statutory right, nor is the right to have that
determination made by the supreme court a statutory right. He did not believe the clerk of district
court should have made the decision on the appealability of the case. Id. Justice Pederson also
believed that the 1975 amendment clearly indicated a legislative intent to allow a defendant to select
a forum which allowed appellate review. He noted that the provision cited by the Chief Justice,
denying the right of appeal from the district court, was no longer part of the statute. Id. The 1975
amendment to section 27-08.1-04 was effective July 1, 1975. The majority opinion, however, was
based on the original 1971 language of section 27-08.1-06.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-05 (Supp. 1979). See also Giles, supra note 42, at 30-33.
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that a plaintiff seldom files sufficient evidence for the judge to make
a decision on the merits without an appearance. In addition, the
most frequent reason for the parties' non-appearance is an out-of-
court settlement. With this in mind, why should the court enter
judgment when the parties have already agreed to a settlement? In
a district court action, failure of the parties to appear on the day of
trial, without notice or justification to the court, would likely result
in an involuntary dismissal of the action. No judgment on the
merits would be issued except the order of dismissal. An
amendment to section 27-08.1-04, providing for entry of judgment
only in those cases in which there is a hearing, would remedy this
problem.
F. JUDGMENT UNSATISFIED - DOCKETING
Section 27-08.1-06 provides that if the defendant fails to pay
the judgment rendered by the court within twenty days after notice
of entry has been filed, the judge of the court, upon application of
the prevailing party, shall certify an abstract of the judgment to the
district court, along with an affidavit of identity signed by the
judgment creditor. 105 No filing fee is required. 106
The section also provides that from the time the judgment is
docketed, it becomes a judgment of the district court for purposes
of execution as well as a lien upon the real property owned by the
debtor in the same manner as an original judgment of the district
court. 10 7 In addition, a judgment debtor involved in a traffic
accident may have his driver's license suspended until the
judgment is satisfied and proof of financial responsibility is
established. 108
Judgments rendered in small claims court may be filed in any
other county with the same effect as if the judgment had been
rendered in the district court wherein the judgment is filed.' 0 9 In
1979, the legislature significantly amended this section to allow
small claims judges to issue executions to the county sheriff in the
105. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-06 (Supp.- 1979). See also Giles, supra note 42, at 33-43; Pagter,
supra note 65, at 886.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-06 (Supp. 1979).
107. Id.
108. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-04(1) (1972). The statute provides for suspension of the
judgment debtor's license when the commissioner of the North Dakota State Highway Department
receives a certified copy of a judgment, or a certified copy of the docket entries in an action resulting
in a judgment for damages, or a certificate of facts relative to a judgment on a form provided by the
commissioner. Id.
109. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-06 (Supp. 1979).
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same manner as issued by the clerk of district court. 110 The small
claims court is not required and does not maintain a judgment
docket, however, and the statute does not provide for transfer by
the small claims court of the judgment to another county for
execution. The new execution procedure would then be effective
only in a county wherein the small claims court is situated. For the
judgment creditor, the best procedure is to record the small claims
court judgment in the district court of the county wherein the
judgment was obtained and retain the option to pursue the
judgment debtor in any county of the state.
G. RECORDS & DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS
Records of the small claims court consist of all documents filed
in each action and a separate index for plaintiffs and defendants.
No other books, records, or papers need be kept.' 11 This section
also provides for a records retention schedule and a method for
records destruction.
All files and records of small claims court are the property of
the county court or the county court of increased jurisdiction." 12
Two cases of the North Dakota Supreme Court have construed the
public's right of access to these records.
In Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons' 13 the Herald sought access
to county court records as specified in several sections of the North
Dakota Century Code. The plaintiff Herald contended that the
Open Records Act gave it the right to inspect all records of the
county court except those records made confidential by a specific
statute." 4 The defendant, Judge Lyons, argued that the statutes in-
effect prior to the 1957 Open Records Act did not allow inspection
110. 1979 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 363, S 2. Once a small claims court judgment is docketed in the
district court, it may be transcribed to any other county in the state, and an execution may be issued
by the clerk of district court to the county sheriff. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08.1-06 (Supp. 1979).
111. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-07 (1974). See also Kosmin, supra note 42, at 974-75, in which
the author states that the inadequacy of present recordkeeping practices in small claims courts
"renders it impossible to accurately assess the success rate of victorious plaintiffs in collecting
judgments and hampers any study of the effectiveness of the courts." Id. at 974. Kosmin reviews
several proposals which are designed to rectify this situation, including provisions which require
plaintiffs to notify the court of the outcome and method of collection. He concludes that the
improvement of record-keeping procedures is an "essential element in any legislative reform of the
present small claims court system." Id. at 975.
112. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-08-10 (1974) (pertains to records of county courts of increased
jurisdiction); N.D. CENT. CODE SS 27-07-28 to -36 (1974) (pertains to records of county courts).
113. 101 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1960). See generally Guy & McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The
Status of Open Meetings and Open Records in North Dakota, 53 N.D.L. REV. 51 (1976).
114. Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 545 (N.D. 1960). Section 44-04-18
of the 1957 Supplement to the 1943 Revised Code provided as follows: "Except as otherwise
specifically provided by law, all records . . . shall be public records, open and accessible for
inspection during reasonable office hours." N.D. REV. CODE S 44-0418 (1943 & Supp. 1957).
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of county court records as demanded by the plaintiff. 115
The trial court held for the defendant, Judge Lyons. The court
reasoned that the provisions of the Open Records Act did not apply
to county court records since there was no specific repeal of section
27-0736 of the North Dakota Revised Code which provided that
only persons having business with the county court may inspect the
court's records. 116 The trial court further held that this section was
not repealed by implication and, therefore, was still in full force and
effect. 117
The trial court further held that persons seeking the right of
access and inspection of county court records must have business
with such records of the court and that discretion is vested with the
county court judge to determine whether the person seeking access
and inspection has a legitimate business interest in the records. 118
Inspection for the purpose of publishing information contained in
the county court records did not constitute having business with
such records, and the plaintiff had no right to access or inspection
of the court records. 119
The North Dakota Supreme Court went further than the trial
court and held that the Open Records Act did not apply to the
records of the county court. 120 After considering the agencies
defined in the statutory legislation, the court stated it did not
believe county courts were included within the meaning of the open
records statute. 121 The court specifically rejected the plaintiff's
argument that county courts were agencies of the state. 122 The
court held that "nowhere do we find any indication that the
Legislature intended 'agencies of the state' to include the courts or
to include anything except those departments, agencies, and
bureaus of the State which it clearly included, such as
'governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions . . . or
political subdivisions.' ",123 The court believed that the legislature,
in adopting the open records law, was not intending to extend to
the public the right to meddle with the private matters of persons
115. 101 N.W.2d at 545. Section 27-0736 of the 1943 Revised Code provided that "[t]he records
of the court shall be open to inspection during office hours by persons having business therewith."
N.D. REV. CooF § 27-0736 (1943).
116. 101 N.W.2d at 545-46. See also Brief for Appellant at 14-16, Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v.
Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1960) (findings of fact).
117. 101 N.W.2d at 545.
118. Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543 (N.D.
1960) (judgment).
119. Id.
120. 101 N.W.2d at 545.
121. Id. at 546. The court did not believe the term "agencies of the state" as used in the statute
included county courts. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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who have business in the court. 124
In 1967 the court again addressed the issue in State ex rel.
Williston Herald v. O'Connell. 125 In that case, the plaintiff filed for an
original writ of mandamus to compel the county judge of the
Williams County court of increased jurisdiction to permit the
inspection of the criminal court files to learn the names of persons
accused of criminal offenses and the disposition of each case. The
plaintiff contended that the court records were public records.' 26
The information contained therein was to be published by the
plaintiff for its readers. 127
The North Dakota Press Association filed an amicus curiae
brief arguing that records of a county court of increased jurisdiction
are not governed by county court statutes. 128 It argued that the
records are similar to district court records which are open to public
inspection without restriction. 129
The defendant argued that these records were kept with other
records which were made confidential by law and that there was a
duty to keep all records safe. Specifically, the defendant relied on
Lyons and sections 27-08-10 and 27-07-36 of the North Dakota
Century Code regarding the care and custody of court records.130
As a practical matter, the defendant did not want the newspaper to
have casual access to the records. 131
The North Dakota Supreme Court characterized the case as
one not involving the right to the information, but rather the
method of obtaining it. The court stated the issue for determination
as follows:
Are the criminal records of a County Court of Increased
Jurisdiction open to inspection during all office hours as a
matter of right; or is the right of the public, including the
right of the petitioner in this proceeding, to appear in
open court at the trial of all criminal cases the only right
which the public, including the petitioner, has to acquaint
itself with the facts and information regarding such
cases? 132
124. Id.
125. 151 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1967).
126. State exrel. Williston Herald v. O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758, 760 (N.D. 1967).
127. Id.
128. Brief for North Dakota Press Ass'n (as amicuscuriae) at 9-10, State ex rel. Williston Herald v.
O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1967).
129. Id.
130. 151 N.W.2d at 760. See also Brief for Respondent at 1-2, State ex re. Williston Herald v.
O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1967).
131. 151 N.W.2d at 760.
132. Id. at 762.
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After discussing Lyons, the court considered section 27-08.1-
10, relating to records of the county court of increased jurisdiction,
and concluded that the statute was silent on the right to inspect the
court records.133 The court then held that the public has a right to
inspect the court records after the case is completed and docketed in
the court files, subject to the court's discretion to impound the file
in any case when justice so requires. 134 The court rejected the
newspaper's argument that it had an unrestricted right to inspect
the court's files at any time during normal hours of the court and
allowed the respondent, Judge O'Connell, to set reasonable rules
and regulations as to who could inspect and how the inspection was
to be made. 135
Although these cases do not interpret the Small Claims Court
Act specifically, they do interpret statutes relating to public access
of county court files. It seems apparent that the rules announced in
these two cases would apply to public access of small claims court
records.
H. REFEREES
As introduced in 1971, the Small Claims Court Act did not
provide for a referee or a separate judge to hear a small claims court
case. 136 During the legislative debate, section 27-08.1-08 was
added, permitting county commissioners to authorize a judge of a
county court of increased jurisdiction to appoint a referee for such
cases. 137
The referee serves at the pleasure of the judge of the county
court, 138 and he is required to qualify in the same manner as all
other civil officers in the state. 139 His duties and powers in the
conduct of trials are governed by Rule 53(c) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as they do not conflict with the
Small Claims Court Act itself. 140
The powers of a referee or master are extensive and include
the power to require production of books, papers, vouchers,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 763.
135. Id.
136. H.B. 1401, 42d N.D. Leg. (1971).
137. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-08 (1974). See also N.D.J. OF THE HOUSE 1371-72 (Mar. 15,
1971); Minutes of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary: Hearing on H.B. 1401 (Mar. 3, 1971). Judge Austin of
the Burleigh County court of increased jurisdiction and Judge Smith of the Grand Forks court of
increased jurisdiction both suggested the provision for a referee. Id.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-08 (1975).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 44-01 (1978).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-08 (1974).
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documents, and writings. 14 1 The referee may also rule upon the
admissibility of evidence, and may examine witnesses and call
parties to the action and examine them. 14 2 As provided in section
27-08.1-05, a written judgment of the decision must be prepared.14
Proceedings in small claims court are bound by the North
Dakota Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 14 4 No provision is made
for a waiver of the rules, as in administrative cases held under the
provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. 14 5 In
administrative cases, an agency or the person conducting the
hearing for the agency may waive the common-law or statutory
rules of evidence, and only evidence of a probative value is
accepted. 4 6
In Williams Electric Cooperative v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. "7
the issue of what is relevant and probative evidence was decided.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that evidence must be
relative to the facts in issue to possess any probative value. 148 Facts
that are remote or collateral are not properly admissible. 4 9 The
court also decided that competent and relevant evidence, which was
available but was not presented at the hearing, could be
considered. 150
This flexible standard of evidence is arguably preferable for
parties in small claims court who do not possess any formal legal
training. The ability of the judge to suspend the rules of evidence
and properly admit evidence that would be helpful to the
141. N.D.R. Civ. P. 53(c).
142. Id.
143. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-05 (Supp. 1979). No cases specifically construing the powers
of a small claims court referee have come before the North Dakota Supreme Court. An 1891 case,
Illstad v. Anderson, 2 N.D. 176, 49 N.W. 659 (1891), may provide some guidance. The case
concerned the referral of a factual matter by the district court to a referee under a provision of the
North Dakota Session Laws of 1889. Id. at 172, 49 N.W. at 659 (citing 1889 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
112). The court indicated that a trial by a referee had the authority to report findings of both law and
fact. Id.
It should be noted, however, that the referees then in office would more closely conform with the
definition of a master. They were not possessed of any independent jurisdiction, and no proceedings
could be initiated before them. Should the question arise again under the Small Claims Court Act,
the court would be faced with a more independent and precisely defined position, and its decision
might change accordingly. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-08 (1974).
144. N.D.R. Civ. P. 43; N.D.R. EVID. 1101. Neither of these rules provides for any waiver of
its provisions for small claims court.
145. Id.
146. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-32-06 (1974). Section 28-32-06 provides for a waiver of the
common law or statutory rules of evidence if such waiver is necessary to ascertain the substantial
rights of all the parties to the proceeding. Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-05 (Supp. 1979).
Section 28-32-05 establishes an informal procedure for administrative cases. Id.
147. 79 N.W.2d 508 (N.D. 1956). The petition for rehearing alleged the appellant did not
receive a fair hearing. Id.
148. Williams Electric Coop. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 79 N.W.2d 508, 525-26 (N.D.
1956).
149. Id. at 526.
150. Id. at 525. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-07 (1974). Section 28-32-07 provides for a
procedure allowing an administrative agency to consider competent and relevant information or
evidence in addition to evidence presented at a hearing. Id.
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resolution of issues before the court is necessary in a small claims
setting. Absent such authority, the judge is bound to impose rules
of evidence that are unfamiliar to the parties, and this could result
in relevant evidence being excluded simply because the parties lack
legal training.
This section also provides that referees shall be versed in the
law and that the county commissioners shall determine the salary or
fee of the referee. 151 The meaning of "versed in the law" is
ambiguous and subject to various interpretations. The question of
sufficient qualifications for a small claims court referee in a county
court with increased jurisdiction has not been decided in North
Dakota. There is, however, one case that does provide some
guidance on how the supreme court may rule on such a question.
In Petition of Teigen'52 the North Dakota Supreme Court
interpreted section 94 of the State Constitution, which requires
supreme court justices to be "learned in the law.'"153 In Teigen the
president of the State Bar Association sought an order enjoining the
Secretary of State from certifying Torfin Austin Teigen for election
to the supreme court. 154 The only issue before the court was the
meaning of "learned in the law in the context of section 94 of our
State Constitution." 155 Facts presented by affidavit and during oral
argument indicated Teigen attended law school for one term, but
did not graduate and had not been admitted to practice law by the
bar of any state. 156
Chief Justice Erickstad, who delivered the opinion of the
court, interpreted the phrase "learned in the law" as synonymous
with "admitted to the bar" or "admitted to practice" by the
151. N.D. CENT. CODE S 27-08.1-08 (1974).
152. 221 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1974).
153. Petition of Teigen, 221 N.W.2d 94, 95 (N.D. 1974). Section 94 of the North Dakota
Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court
unless he be learned in the law." N.D. CONST. S 94 (1930) (repealed N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 615, 5 94
(1975)).
Section 94 now provides as follows:
Supreme court justices and district judges shall be citizens of the United States and
residents of this state, shall be learned in the law, and shall possess any additional
qualifications prescribed by law. Judges of other courts shall be selected for such terms
and shall have such qualifications as may be prescribed by law.
N.D. CONST. S 94 (1975) (emphasis added).
154. 221 N.W.2d at 98. North Dakota Bar Association President William R. Pearce filed an
affidavit with the court pursuant to section 16-01-10 of the North Dakota Century Code alleging
Teigen did not possess the qualifications prescribed by the North Dakota Constitution to be eligible
for the office of judge of the supreme court and that it would be error for the Secretary of State to
certify Teigen's name to be placed on the ballot. Id. at 96; N.D. REV. CODE S 16-0110 (1943).
155. 221 N.W.2d at 98.
156. Id. Teigen did not file any affidavits but stated during oral argument that he had received a
law degree from the Minneapolis School of Law on June 1, 1931. Id.
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supreme court of the state. 157 He relied on the reasoning of two
Minnesota cases in which the candidates who sought election to
judicial positions were not admitted to practice law in the State of
Minnesota.15 8 The court held that neither was entitled to have his
name placed on the ballot because neither was an attorney at law
and, therefore, not learned in the law. 159
In adopting the North Dakota standard, the Chief Justice held
that "one must first be admitted to the bar or to the practice of law
by this court before one may have his name placed on the ballot as a
candidate for the office ofjudge of this court." 60
Candidates for county court of increased jurisdiction must be
"learned in the law." ' ' 6' A county justice shall be licensed to
practice law in North Dakota. 62 Logically then, a small claims
court referee or judge must be learned in the law as a licensed
attorney in order to hold office. ' 63
V. CONCLUSION
North Dakota has a long history of encouragement of minor
dispute resolution. The Boards of Conciliation were the nation's
first attempt at community conciliation and reflected the heritage of
the state's immigrants for private resolution of these matters.
County Debt Adjustment Boards are now forty-five years old
and exist today as an unknown and unused alternative to small
claims courts. Their function as conciliator of claims, without
monetary limitation, presents an innovative method of community
dispute resolution without the necessity of court intervention. More
analysis and examination of these boards is needed to determine if
they can perform as an alternative to prolonged and costly
litigation.
Small claims courts are serving a valid purpose, although not
as successfully as the concept envisions. Strict adherence to the
rules of evidence and procedure is difficult for both litigants and the
157. Id.
158. Id. The Minnesota cases were In re Daly, 294 Minn. 351, 200 N.W.2d 913 (1972); jack v.
Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425 (1914).
159. 221 N.W.2d at 99.
160. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Maxwell reached the conclusion that Teigen was not
learned in the law, but for different reasons. He refused to equate "learned in the law" with
"licensed to practice law." Justice Maxwell based his concurrence on Teigen's unprofessional
affidavit to the court and his conduct during oral arguement. Id. (MaxwellJ., concurring).
161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08-08.1 (Supp. 1979).
162. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 27-18-02 (1974).
163. N.D. CENT. COnE § 27-08.1-08 (1974). Section 27-08.1-08 provides that the small claims
court referee must be "versed in the law," and section 27-18-02 provides that the county justice shall
be licensed to practice law in North Dakota. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-18-02 (1974).
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small claims court judge. State supreme court decisions have
imposed additional burdens for plaintiffs by requiring rigid service
requirements. As such, it will remain difficult for layman
successfully to pursue and collect small judgments in small claims
court. The changes in the law recommended here may help resolve
some of these problems, but not all of them.
The function of small claims court is appropriate for the
resolution of minor disputes in North Dakota, and the past decade
has proved that many individuals and small businesses have used
this forum. It remains to be seen whether the troublesome portions
of the law will permit this court to perform its intended function as
an inexpensive and uncomplicated forum for minor dispute
resolution in the years to come.

